Can Intelligence Influence the Outcome of a Conflict

In 1945, in the wake of victory over Nazi Germany, the Western Allies faced a daunting and unprecedented task. The nation they now controlled was in ruins, militarily defeated and with millions of civilians and soldiers having been killed in the fighting. The regime which had ruled the country for the past twelve years had surrendered unconditionally, and the leader who had personified it was dead. That the Nazi leadership had exploited the economic hardship following the end of the First World War, the harsh terms imposed by the Versailles Treaty and the effects of the Great Depression was a fact the Allies were keenly aware of, and they were determined not to repeat the mistakes of the past.

It was clear that Germany must be rebuilt, in order to ensure that another militaristic regime would not rise to power in the shattered country to fill the void left in the Nazis’ wake. There was also the longer-term military situation to consider.

While the US in particular could draw on enormous resources to occupy and rebuild Germany, it could not maintain the initial force of 4.5 million men it now fielded indefinitely. The Soviet Union, having endured tremendous losses during the campaign, had taken control of half the country, with Berlin split into separate zones of control and with the fighting against Germany now over, suspicion was beginning to grow on both sides. Some high-ranking military commanders and politicians feared that the Soviet Union might attempt to bring the whole of Germany under its control, and indeed as early as May 1945 had ordered a review of plans for a war with Russia which was ultimately deemed possible to win, but too risky to be undertaken.

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This new political and military reality, that the much larger occupying Soviet force might attempt to continue to expand into western Germany, or at least attempt to bring the eastern half of the country into the orbit of Soviet Russia, combined with the need to establish the whereabouts of those former Nazi High Command who had not already surrendered, and to pacify elements of the state apparatus and civilian population still loyal to the regime. A relatively little discussed aspect of post war Germany is how many ordinary people remained actively committed to Nazi ideology, particularly young people radicalised in organisations such as the Hitler Youth, and who in some cases resisted occupation after the country had officially surrendered in the form of so-called ‘Werewolf Brigades.’

However, there remained concerns that a rebuilt and reinvigorated Germany, fresh from two humiliating military defeats, might once again pose a major geopolitical threat before too long. A major feature of this transition, as this dissertation will discuss and which is in direct contrast to the second case study it will present, was the recruitment of former Nazi bureaucrats, police and intelligence officials, albeit excluding those who had been involved in some of the worst crimes perpetrated by the regime, into the new state apparatus, in part because they were eminently qualified, and because the Soviet threat required an effective intelligence and counter intelligence operation be set up as soon as possible.

As will be detailed below, the Allies were left with limited options in this regard. The situation only became more urgent in 1947 after the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons, and the chances of a Third World War, fought on German soil once again, dramatically increased. Some important figures on the Allied side had in fact, begun advocating for just such an outcome before the stakes became too high.

In this way, it could be said that the need for effective intelligence, targeted against a new potential enemy, was a major factor in the success of the US occupation of Germany, and by extension the German nation itself after the Second World War. The military arm of the occupation was well-manned, effective and perceived widely as even handed and fair, creating little need to create an intelligence infrastructure devoted to counterinsurgency in Germany. Rather, this situation freed American and other Allied intelligence assets to concentrate on exterior threats and by extension, Soviet intelligence efforts within West Germany. The potential for conflict heightened the necessity for speed in creating an effective intelligence apparatus in the country, particularly one which could endure beyond occupation and remain a reliable ally against the Soviet Union, and as such underlay the decision to incorporate elements of the Nazi state into the West German intelligence community.

The Allies succeeded in assisting Germany, over the course of a huge, eleven year operation, to become a peaceful democracy, with economic strength rather than military expansion driving its progress even as a substantial military threat in the form of the Soviet Union loomed over its eastern border for another 40 years. Although American troops remained in West Germany long after this initial occupation, the country was able to separate government from strategic military command and function independently after a relevantly short period. This is in stark contrast to the second case study this dissertation will examine: The Second Gulf War.

Case Study Two: Outline

The invasion of Iraq in 2003, whilst categorically similar to the previous case study (a U.S. led military campaign followed by a lengthy period of occupation and domestic pacification), on closer inspection bears little resemblance to the German example, and there are a number of significant differences which help to explain the opposing outcomes of each case study. After a far less bloody campaign in the initial military operations of the war when compared to the previous case study, the aftermath of the Coalition invasion of Iraq soon descended into a hard fought counter insurgency campaign, which initially resulted in the withdrawal of the majority of American and British forces after six unsuccessful years, followed shortly by the emergence of the Islamic State and the renewal of U.S. combat operations in the country.

From a strategic point of view, the military outcome of this example was in far less doubt than was the case in the campaign against Germany. U.S. forces stationed at bases in allied nations such as Saudi Arabia and on naval carrier groups were well placed to mount a campaign against Iraq, Iraqi forces were heavily outmatched in terms of technology, firepower and military intelligence. Indeed, whilst it is true that the initial military campaign in Iraq caused massive damage to the country, it was certainly in a position to be optimistic about the future than was Germany in 1945.

However, in this case, the U.S. led Coalition can be said to have thoroughly failed in almost all its stated aims, with the exception perhaps of regime change, and even in this case there have been serious issues with the successive Iraqi governments which have struggled to establish their legitimacy despite U.S. and international recognition and support. This is particularly so in terms of its failure to combat the extremist ideologies of both the Ba’athist government and the inflow of Salafist terrorist organisations that formed the backbone of armed opposition in Iraq in the post invasion period. There is also the most infamous failure associated with the Iraq War to consider; the presence (or lack thereof) of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) which were among the most important of the publicly stated elements of the Coalition’s justification for war.

As this dissertation will argue, much of this failure can be attributed to an absence of those factors which made post conflict operations in Germany so successful; well-developed intelligence together with appropriate relations between intelligence agencies and political and military leadership, adequate manpower, a well-planned and thorough humanitarian assistance and reconstruction effort in tandem with a popular and legitimate political transition, and public support for the war itself among the Allied nations’ population as well as the relative good will of the occupied population, including cooperation between occupied and occupier security and intelligence services. It must also be noted that there were acute tribal and social divides in Iraq which were not present in Germany, and which played a key role in the outcome in Iraq. These will be discussed in depth below.

However, among the biggest differences between the two cases, this dissertation will argue, is the disbandment of each countries’ military and intelligence apparatus: in Germany, the Allies made a difficult but ultimately necessary decision to absorb a significant number of these individuals into the functions of the new government; in Iraq, the military and security structures of the old regime were almost entirely swept away, leaving a power vacuum and a considerable number of young men and leadership figures with military training embittered toward their erstwhile liberators, who in turn were required to take on these roles using their own forces for some time.

Ultimately, this dissertation will use the above case studies to show that while intelligence must be a fundamental part of any post conflict operation no matter what the scale, but particularly in cases where the civilian population of a country has been indoctrinated by extremist leadership, if utilised incorrectly it can also become the operation’s most critical point of failure. It will go on to argue that the Iraqi case study, as well as other recent conflicts led by Western nations, shows a worrying trend toward an over reliance on technology and the improper application of intelligence at the expense of gaining popular support in the post conflict landscape. It concludes by examining the ways in which intelligence should be used in support of post conflict operations based on the case studies and on the likely realities of possible future conflicts.