The Injustice in the Trial of Socrates

Socrates and Justice

In dialectic with Polus, Socrates argues that committing an injustice is worse than suffering one. This assertion is largely based on Socrates’ intuition that by nature, humans shun evil, meaning that because of the damage that the commission of injustice inflicts upon the soul, one would prefer to receive an injustice rather than inflict one. Here, I will argue that despite the eloquent rhetoric Socrates offers in support of his claim, certain situations and individual tendencies can render his argument invalid.

For Socrates’ assertion to hold, he claims that doing injustice must either be more shameful, more painful, or both than suffering injustice (475a-c). Both Polus and Socrates agree that doing injustice is certainly not more painful, eliminating that possibility and therefore the option of both. From this juncture, Socrates claims that doing injustice must then be more shameful and evil than suffering it. In doing so, he employs the concepts of beauty and ugliness, asserting that because committing an injustice is much uglier than suffering one, it must be less preferable (4750).

Additionally, Socrates argues that “he who does not have vice in his soul” is far happier than he who does, i.e. he who commits unjust acts (478d). As a result, Socrates argues, we prefer to suffer injustice, which, though painful, does not impose a debt upon our souls, than to do injustice, which corrupts and mars them.

Socrates’ claim is well-argued yet falls short due to what I believe to be an overzealous scope and over-simplification.

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First, the term “injustice” is a vast one, one that encompasses a multitude of misdeeds ranging from theft and deceit to tyranny and murder. Socrates argues that because human beings tend to shun evil, we harm ourselves when we commit unjust acts. However, the harm that is inflicted upon an individual who lies versus that suffered by a tyrant is incomparable as one act is far more heinous than the other. Thus, it is reasonable to doubt that Socrates’ claim applies equally to all misdeeds and all acts of injustice; in the case of very minor acts of injustice, little intrinsic harm is suffered by the perpetrator. Imagine that a poor man steals bread from a grocery store to feed his family. In comparison to other acts – violence, murder, tyranny – this injustice is quite minor. As he is helping those he loves, the man may even receive more benefit than harm from committing the act. This line of thought does not completely refute Socrates’ claim but does cast doubt and suggest instances – particularly when the injustice committed is relatively minor – where Socrates’ line of reasoning may prove false. Furthermore, the concept of one’s reputation plays a significant role in Socrates’ argument.

In asserting that doing injustice is more shameful, he is implying a shame that comes from the perceptions and opinions of third-parties and societal norms. Certainly, the judgements of others and society can be highly potent deterrents of unjust action, but are they relevant in determining whether doing or suffering injustice is more evil? This reveals the contradiction between innate human nature and social law. If there were no negative social judgements for doing injustice, it is reasonable to suspect that more people would be willing to engage in such behavior. Callicles, who later enters the debate, addresses this tension between nature and custom (483). Though Socrates seems to be citing nature in his argument, his assertions, Callicles points out, are based more firmly in law and custom. This, I believe, turns Socrates’ assertion from one about the innate tendencies and preferences of humans to our perceived societal obligations and expectations.

In addition, Socrates claims that punishment is capable of cleansing the soul after an act of injustice has been committed; he argues that punishment ultimately results in happiness because it serves as a necessary retribution for our crimes (472d). In his initial refutation of this claim, Polus cites the example of the tyrant Archelaus who achieved great power and stature through injust deeds. I believe that, were a man such as Archelaus, who evidently possesses a negligible moral compass, to be punished for his crimes, he would certainly not be happy in the tangible, self-aware sense of that emotion. Thus, though Socrates argues that Archelaus’ soul would be purified of his wrongdoing – a very theoretical, intangible argument – the man would lack conscious awareness of that cleansing and would be far more likely to experience anger, frustration, vengeance, or any wide range of negative emotions, but none verging on happiness or gratitude.

Thus, though it is certainly possible to argue that for some evil-doers, punishment culminates in a moment of self-awareness, regret, and eventual reform, this would undeniably not occur for all. Thus, were that cleansing not to be felt consciously and concretely, but rather occur on an entirely intangible level, it cannot, I believe, be considered relevant. Undeniably, Socrates’ logical, clever presentation of his argument is compelling. However, I do not believe that is is applicable to all individuals in all situations. In the cases of those who commit minor acts of injustice and those who feel no shame or remorse, Socrates’ intuition ultimately does not appear valid.