Quirino Grandstand Hostage

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I. Introduction

Although the history of snatch and hostage-taking is a really long one. it is merely comparatively late that there has been a systematic effort to understand the effects. both long-run and short-run. on persons and their households. This is an of import issue for clinical and academic grounds. The advice of mental wellness professionals is sought with increasing frequence with respect to the strategic direction of surety incidents and the clinical direction of those who have been abducted.

There is grounds to propose that how best to assist those who have been taken surety is a sensitive and complex affair. and those who deal with such persons should be every bit good informed as possible since such events can hold long-run inauspicious effects. peculiarly on immature kids.

Quirino Grandstand Manila

The Manila surety crisis.

officially known as the Rizal Park hostage-taking incident occurred when a dismissed Philippine National Police officer took over a tourer coach in Rizal Park. Manila. Philippines on August 23. 2010. Disgruntled former senior inspector Rolando Mendoza of the Manila Police District ( MPD ) hijacked a tourer coach transporting 25 people ( 20 tourers and a tour usher from Hong Kong. and four Filipinos ) in an effort to acquire his occupation back. He said that he had been summarily and below the belt dismissed. and that all he wanted was a just hearing and the chance to support himself.

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Negotiations broke down dramatically about 10 hours into the stand-off. when the constabulary arrested Mendoza’s brother and therefore incited him to open fire. As the shot began. the coach driver managed to get away. and was shown on telecasting stating “Everyone is dead” before being whisked away by police officers.

Mendoza and eight of the sureties were killed and a figure of others injured. The MPD’s failed deliverance effort and gun-battle with the highjacker. which took around 90 proceedingss. were watched by 1000000s on unrecorded telecasting and the cyberspace. The Filipino and Hong Kong authoritiess conducted separate probes into the incident. Both enquiries judged that the victims had been unlawfully killed. and identified the Philippine officials’ hapless handling of the incident as the cause of the eight hostages’ deceases. The assault mounted by the MPD. and the ensuing shoot-out. have been widely criticized by initiates as “bungled” and “incompetent” . and the Hong Kong Government has issued a “black” travel qui vive for the Philippines as a consequence of the matter.

II. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

It was August 23. 2010 when the whole universe alarmed in one of the most tragic surety taking happened in Quirino Grandstand Manila. Philippines. Many people were sad and shocked to what happened in the said event. At approximately 9:30 in the forenoon. dismissed committee constabulary officer Rolando Mendoza took surety 25 tourers from Hongkong and some Filipino staff who were in a coach to go forth Fort Santiago for Manila’s Rizal Park. The resulting surety lasted 11 hours and ended with nine persons. including the surety taker. dead. 1 and the other sureties were injured.

Harmonizing to the study Mendoza is a hard-working and sort. He received tonss of award for being courageous and loyal to his profession. Mendoza said he was summarily dismissed without the chance to decently support himself. and that all he wanted was a just hearing. 2 and to acquire his occupation back. He did this manner merely to acquire attending the authorities functionary.

As we all know Media is the most likely beginning of information for most people. In this sort of state of affairs it is really unsafe occupation for the media because he has to set himself in a topographic point that should be right. 3 but in what happened in the Quirino Grandstand Hostage taking crisis it seem that many media people were blamed because they reported beyond the bound.

We are in the fact that a media individual serve as entree of information of issues that are of public concern even if they are at hazard. There were many media oversights in that incident. Towards the eventide of the surety taking. many media webs were covering the surety taking crisis unrecorded. Among none of them did it look to hold occurred to that irresponsible coverage of the event could be lives. 4 Some of them during the surety event reported the unconfirmed information. they revealed the constabulary and military personnels motion and many more oversights that caused the choler of Mendoza.

III. BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS ( HOSTAGE TAKER AND CAPTIVE/S )

IV. MOTIVES IN THE INCIDENT

Taking sureties has a long history as a method. with variable effectivity. of procuring grants from persons. administrations and authoritiess. More late. it has become a popular maneuver among terrorist administrations. Although the resiliency of persons should ne’er be underestimated. there is grounds that being taken surety can hold digesting effects. peculiarly on kids. Persons vary in how they cope with such an experience. both during and subsequent to it.

The literature demonstrates that the research base is limited. and many of import inquiries remain to be answered. Hostage-taking is an country of clinical and scientific involvement. Apart from the demand to set up the most effectual post-incident intercessions for single sureties and their households. there are chances to develop farther penetrations into the kineticss and effects of unequal power relationships.

V. PROBLEMS

The ideal equipment of a SWAT squad more or less are as follows: communicating setup. armour waistcoat. helmets. gas mask. handguns. assault rifles for close one-fourth conflict. handlocks. synchronized tickers. field glassess. telescopes. dark vision goggles. buffeting random-access memories. ladders. ropes. stun grenades. tear gas. fume grenades. stick visible radiations. torchs. limelights. telescopic gun sights. hydraulic knuckleboness. bolt cutters. glass shutter explosives. fire asphyxiator. fireman’s ax. concatenation saw. SWAT new wave. baseball mitts. woodworking tools. acetylene torch and rain cogwheels. There was deficiency of equipment on the portion of Manila SWAT to manage the state of affairs. Although they had their basic arms such as their armour waistcoat ( the effectivity are already in deep inquiry ) . their rifles. handguns and Kevlar helmets but still by criterions. these are non equal to turn to the surety crisis state of affairs.

It is really apparent that they were non even transporting with them torchs but all of the clip they were describing and kicking that the inside of the coach was dark. The deficiency of equipment already put the breaching operation into a via media. The component of surprise was gone that resulted into a stall that lasted for erstwhile thereby jeopardizing lives. The uncertainty sing the effectivity of their armour vest contributed to the apprehensiveness of the SWAT members to hotfoot inside the coach during the assault.

The Manila SWAT was non merely ill-equipped but they were non trained in different sorts of state of affairss. In fact they had to practise on the really twenty-four hours of the surety state of affairs. The preparations of the Manila SWAT as provided by the Manila Police District are non updated and simulated operations were conducted. if of all time conducted. was a long clip ago. They don’t even cognize the consecutive Numberss of their guns at an instant question. They train on their ain personal history. Skill acquired through preparations diminishes after some clip and demands to be invariably updated.

VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM

VII. Decision

The grounds presented for the decriminalisation are evidently overpowering. In a nutshell. by all criterions. Gen. Magtibay was an unqualified commanding officer. organiser and director. To exceed this off. he was besides grossly and recklessly insubordinate at a most important minute. One is tempted to set the whole incrimination on the surety fiasco upon him. if non for the every bit inexplicable oversights and indecisivenesss committed by both his higher-ups and work forces all throughout the surety crisis. specifically on scheme. intelligence. coordination. and deployment. But it is without inquiry that he carries the biggest answerability for the black and homicidal result of the surety crisis. As such. it stands to ground for the Senate and the House of Representatives to give decriminalisation of libel a opportunity.

Honestly. as an person I got pissed off because those people tasked to manage the state of affairs didn’t do it by the book. First and foremost to be considered is the safety of the sureties which as viewed was ne’er the order of precedence of those people expected to salvage same. In all hostage-taking play that I’ve known. neutralizing the hostage-taker is no. 1 in the docket. which if ab initio done could hold prevented the slaughter. I merely hope this won’t go on once more. but if it does- merely neutralize the hostage-taker one time and the play will stop! It’s such a black and hideous event that the merely positive thing we get out of the experience is to larn something from it. From that Learn we have to our errors. .

VIII. Recommendation

The probe study besides recommended administrative or condemnable charges for 15 persons and organisations. including Manila city manager Alfredo Lim. Vice-Mayor Isko Moreno. ombudsmen Merceditas Gutierrez and Emilio Gonzales III. authorities undersecretary Rico J. Puno. retired Philippine National Police main manager general Jesus Verzosa. National Capital Region Police Office manager Leocadio Santiago Jr. . Manila Police District head overseer Rodolfo Magtibay. MPD surety negotiant Orlando Yebra. SWAT commanding officer Santiago Pascual. journalists Erwin Tulfo and Mike Rogas. and three broadcast medium webs.

The IIRC recommended that an administrative instance be filed against negotiant constabulary Superintendent Orland Yebra and that possible condemnable liability should be determined. but the Palace merely recommended disregard of responsibility without any recommendation on possible condemnable instance. The IIRC besides recommended that Chief Inspector Santiago Pascual be held apt for gross incompetency and possible condemnable action. but the Palace affirmed the gross incompetency instance without recommendation for possible condemnable liability. The filing of administrative and condemnable instances against Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim. but Malacanang said that Lim should be held apt for simple disregard of responsibility and misconduct. Charges be filed against several personalities but the recommendation was revised when it reached Malacanang.

IX. Reference
1. First Report of the INCIDENT INVESTIGATION and REVIEW COMMITTEE on the August. 23. 2010 Rizal Park Hostage-taking Incident: Sequence OF EVENTS. EVALUATION and RECOMMENDATIONS. Incident Investigation and Review Committee. September 16. 2010. pp. 9–10. 16. 22. 24. 2. ”Hong Kong criticizes managing of Manila surety crisis” . Reuters. August 23. 2010. hypertext transfer protocol: //www. reuters. com/article/2010/08/23/us-philippines-hostage-hongkong-idUSTRE67M35B20100823. Retrieved July 14. 2011. 3. Mair. John ; Blanchard. Ben ( August 24. 2010 ) . “Philippines defends handling of coach surety crisis” . International Business Times. 4. hypertext transfer protocol: //uk. ibtimes. com/articles/45880/20100824/philippines-defends-handling-