Operation Anaconda Breakdown

In September 2001, the United States Army started Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The organization’s structure was not the standard military structure. When conducting a joint operation of this magnitude, lack of Command Authority, bad intelligence, limited resources, and terrain conditions can affect the outcome of the mission.

Lack of Command Authority

The Joint Operational Command structure was not the standard structure for Operation Anaconda. The Command structure was Command Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain, which had tactical control over JSOTFs Dagger, K Bar, TF 64, and OPCON of TF Rakkasan.

Black Special Operation Force (SOF) was on the grounds but they were not under the CJTF chain of Command, which created many challenges for CJTF Mountain. One of the challenges was that Black SOF would request the same equipment that CJTF Mountain needed to complete its mission. Which caused a shortage in AC-130s that CJTF Mountain needed. Another challenge they had was trying to create a good working relationship with Black SOP.

Even though CJTF Mountain had tactical control over Task Force KBAR, and TF Dagger, Black SOF would try to take control over some of their assets, especially The AC-130s they required for their task. These issues were eventually worked out however if there was a Geographical Combat Commander in charge of the entire region these issues would have been resolved a lot sooner.

Bad Intelligence

CJTF Mountain did not gather enough intelligence before executing Operation Anaconda. They relied too much on Human Intelligence they received from the local Afghan people.

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According to Robert McElroy, the US should was have relied more on “cyber intelligence assets” and “air- and spaceborne sensors” (McElroy 2002). The air sensors did identify that there might be 22 enemy fighting positions and 40 cave entrances in the valley of Shahi Kot. The US knew from a past battle between the Afghans and the Soviet Union that the Afghan Guerrillas had success fighting in the Valley of Shahi Kot. Therefore, the US had TF Dagger create a plan to take out anyone in that area. The United States did not have any artillery or mortal support to provide fires or give ordnance support; instead, they had to rely on the Air Force to send strikes. The Navy had only one of its naval carriers in the region. Due to a lack of intelligence, they were unaware, of the operation so the naval carrier was on a “picnic day” during the first day of the battle (Mc Elroy 2002). This could have created a problem because the Airforce could have used the carriers to refuel their planes and get back into action.

Use of Joint Functions

The Combined Joint Task Force decided not to include the CFACC in the planning of the battle for airstrikes until two days before the battle began. The issue with that is the CFACC has many years of experience with air attacks, that type of experience is irreplaceable. If CJTF Mountain had notified them early, they could have given them valuable information that could assist with air attacks.

Another challenge the US had to deal with was the Afghans. The US barely utilized its Afghan allies during the battle due to a lack of confidence in them. The Afghan was from a Mulita called Pushtun. One of their tasks was to arrest any enemy fighters trying to escape to Pakistan, however when the fighting started they let them get away. These actions caused the US to rely heavily on the Air force for assistance. Since the Afghans were not directly under the CJTF, which gave them the ability to walk away anytime they wanted.

A gunship hit Afghan troops. This caused and “killed 1 American and 2 friendly Afghan soldiers while injuring 17 others.” The Afghan commanders lost confidence in their abilities and left the battle.

Terrain Condition

Terrain conditions may be critical when considering movement. The rugged terrain in Afghanistan and high altitude made it difficult for US airstrikes. The terrain created challenges with the satellites and radio frequencies making it difficult for the aircraft to talk directly to the forces on the ground. Without good communication, the pilots would cancel the airstrikes Shahi-Kot Valley is approximately 5 miles long. This created an obstacle, allowing one airplane at a time to strike. Which in return slowed down the airstrikes. Shahi- Kot Valley had many caves in it that the enemy used to barricade themselves in while attacking the US forces. General Hagenbeck attempted to use his Apache helicopters to suppress enemy fire while flying low over the mountain terrain in daylight however; the helicopters began to take fire causing them to abort.

Conclusion

If the United States is involved in any conflicts it should ensure Command Authority is established, they receive valuable intelligence, and proper resources, and consider terrain conditions when planning for any mission.

References

Andres, R. B., & Hukill, J. B. (2007, July). ANACONDA: A Flawed Joint Planning Process. Retrieved from http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/apjinternational/apj-s/2009/3tri09/andreseng.htm

Fleri, E., Howard, E., Hukill, J., & Searle, T. R. (2003). Operation Anaconda case study. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education.

Robert H. McElroy, “Fire Support for Operation Anaconda,” Field Artillery (September/October 2002), 5–9.